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Abstract 
Codetermination—a system of shared corporate governance between 
shareholders and workers—has been mostly ignored within the U.S. 
corporate governance literature. When it has made an appearance, it has 
largely served as a foil for shareholder primacy and as an example of 
corporate deviance. However, over the last fifteen years—and especially 
in the last five—empirical research on codetermination has shown 
surprising results as to the system’s efficiency, resilience, and benefits to 
stakeholders. This Article reviews the extant American legal scholarship 
on codetermination and provides a fresh look at the current state of 
codetermination theory and practice. Rather than experiencing the 
failures predicted by our law-and-economics framework of shareholder 
primacy, codetermination has fared better than alternative systems, 
particularly with respect to the ravages of the Global Financial Crisis of 
2008. At a time when corporate leaders, politicians, and academics are 
rethinking the shareholder primacy model, this Article presents an 
updated perspective on codetermination and invites U.S. scholars to 
reexamine their prior assumptions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
European codetermination—the system of corporate governance 
where shareholders and employees share control—has long stood in 
contrapose to our Anglo-American system of shareholder primacy. The 
contrast was not as stark in the middle of the twentieth century, when a 
third of U.S. employees were represented by unions, and corporate 
executives ruled with relative autonomy. But as shareholders grew more 
assertive and academics pressed for a more robust adherence to the 
primacy norm, the presence of employee representatives on the corporate 
board became a point of divergence between Anglo-American and 
Continental European companies.1 And by century’s end, the United 
States had introduced its corporate governance model into the former 
Soviet-bloc countries and endeavored to make it the international 
standard.2 Pure and unadulterated shareholder wealth maximization was 
ascendant. 
Academic attention to codetermination’s alternative governance 
model has been, at best, somewhat spotty. Since the 1970s, 
codetermination has surfaced in U.S. legal scholarship primarily as a 
counterexample, and occasionally as a bête noire, for advocates of the 
dominant paradigm.3 Even supporters of stakeholder governance—
whose vision of the corporation involves paying attention to the fortunes 
of all corporate constituents—have not paid it too much attention. It can 
come across as an unusual creature, an odd duck—a tapir in a world of 
horses, pigs, and cows. 
Shareholder primacy, however, is losing some of its shine, and the 
corporate governance establishment is just starting to look around for 
other models.4 In the meantime, codetermination has not disappeared—
 
 1. See generally CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-
LAW WORLD (2013) (discussing the divergences between these models). 
 2. Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons from Russian 
Enterprise Fiascoes, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720, 1721 (2000) (“After the fall of Russian 
Communism, state enterprises were privatized rapidly, stock markets created, and a corporate 
legal code adopted.”). 
 3. See infra Section II.B. 
 4. See, e.g., David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer 
Everything, Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html [https://perma.cc/L3W7-PLM9]. 
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in fact, it seems to be thriving. While the 2008–2009 financial crisis 
crippled economies across the globe, systems with codetermination were 
more resilient than most.5 In particular, Germany, with its distinctive and 
well-known version of worker participation, has been an island of 
economic stability over the last fifteen years, despite the complexity 
inherent in merging two countries, one of which was a Soviet satellite. At 
a time when academics, politicians, and business leaders are engaged in 
a dramatic rethinking of the shareholder-oriented consensus, 
codetermination has been hiding in plain sight. 
While American scholars have had a small but somewhat steady diet 
of articles and book chapters on codetermination, this literature is 
significantly undersized, especially relative to the attention lavished on 
the minutiae of shareholder primacy. A deeper dive into the workings of 
codetermination is critical now that environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) investors are pushing for more than happy talk and the 
shareholder primacy model is losing its grip. Fortuitously, a surge in 
economic research on codetermination provides a rich vein for 
investigation by corporate law scholars, who have immersed themselves 
in economic analysis since the 1970s. 
This Article explores codetermination, with a focus on German 
codetermination, in theory and practice. To begin, Part I establishes the 
basics of codetermination and briefly reviews both the U.S. and German 
experience with employee representation. Part II then explores 
codetermination in theory, particularly within the literature on 
shareholder primacy from the last forty years of research. Finally, Part III 
discusses the recent economic literature on codetermination, particularly 
its effects on economic performance, shareholders, and other 
stakeholders. We believe that American scholars need to make 
codetermination part of the corporate governance research agenda, and 
we hope this Article will provide a useful entry point for our cohorts.  
I.  WHAT IS CODETERMINATION? 
Shareholder primacy is so entrenched in American corporate law and 
scholarship that it sometimes seems difficult to imagine any other way of 
thinking about the corporation. This lack of imagination may help explain 
why arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise continue to plod 
along in the background of an awful lot of corporate governance 
scholarship. And it has certainly kept many legal scholars from seriously 
considering alternative models. There are, however, good examples of 
such models, some of which have been around for a century. What’s 
more, these alternative models specifically involve employee 
representation on corporate boards. 
 
 5. See infra Section III.A. 
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“Codetermination” is the umbrella term for systems in which workers 
play an official role in corporate governance. Germany has the most well-
known codetermination regime, but other European countries, such as 
Austria, Poland, Denmark, and Sweden, have their own varieties.6 The 
term itself reflects the principle of shared governance—the joint 
management of enterprise between capital and labor.7 As a broader 
principle, codetermination sometimes encompasses other methods of 
worker–management cooperation, such as works councils or interest 
arbitration.8 However, it more frequently refers specifically to designated 
worker representation on corporate boards.9 
This Article focuses on German codetermination because of its 
notoriety, its comprehensive nature, and the importance of Germany to 
the international economy. We begin, however, with a look at the history 
of codetermination and worker participation within the United States.  
  
 
 6. Jens Dammann, The Mandatory Law Puzzle: Redefining American Exceptionalism in 
Corporate Law, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 478 (2014) (“Many other European countries including 
Austria, France, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands have also adopted some 
type of codetermination regime.”); Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: 
Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 203, 203 (1994) (“Labor participation on corporate boards exists in many 
European countries, albeit in very different forms and degrees.”). 
 7. Clyde W. Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structured Exception to 
Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129, 133 (1993) (finding that under codetermination, 
workers are “considered members of the enterprise and entitled to a voice in its decisions, with a 
share in the enterprise because of their contribution to its production and profitability”). 
 8. Id. at 135–36; see also Julian Constain, Note, A New Standard for Governance: 
Reflections on Worker Representation in the United States, 24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 409, 
412–13 (2019) (“German codetermination operates in two distinct ways. First, it exists at the shop 
level through workers’ councils; second, it exists at the corporate level through the representation 
of workers on supervisory boards.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Tailored Claims and Governance: 
The Fit Between Employees and Shareholders, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 121, 
147–48 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (noting that codetermination “refers to 
employee representatives on the board of directors”); Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker 
Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 
1749, 1753 (1990) (defining German codetermination as a system “under which workers in all 
large corporations are entitled to elect up to half of the company’s board of directors”); Hopt, 
supra note 6, at 203; Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing 
Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 936 
(1993) (“Under the German system of codetermination, workers elect representatives to serve on 
supervisory boards of directors that engage in strategic corporate decisionmaking.”). 
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A.  Codetermination in the United States 
In the United States, corporate boards have been almost exclusively 
the domain of shareholders.10 While the United States has some history 
of employee participation on corporate boards, it is pretty thin gruel.11 
Because state law dictates corporate governance, a system of 
codetermination would be up to the states to implement (absent future 
federalization). The oldest state codetermination law still in force is a 
1919 Massachusetts statute that expressly allows a corporation to have 
employee representatives on its board.12 That law, however, is 
permissive, and after a brief boomlet of participating companies at the 
time of its passage, there is not much evidence that Massachusetts 
corporations have made use of the option.13 Corporate boards have 
remained free from mandated employee representation under state law. 
Despite its absence from corporate law, the idea of employee board 
representation in practice has waxed and waned over the years.14 As a 
general matter, unions have largely been uninterested or opposed to the 
idea, as they have feared that board representation might lead to 
cooptation, compromise, and weakness.15 In the 1970s, however, labor 
unions engaged in several (ultimately unsuccessful) efforts for board 
representation in individual companies. In their role as shareholders, 
workers and union pension funds introduced proxy proposals for 
employee board representation at companies like Ford, AT&T, and 
United Airlines.16 Unions were only successful in their efforts when 
working with management as part of overall labor negotiations. In 1973, 
a small railroad company agreed to board representation as part of a 
collective bargaining agreement.17 In 1980, the United Auto Workers 
secured a board seat for its president at Chrysler, and a union member 
 
 10. See Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 85, 86–87 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. 
McDonnell eds., 2012) (discussing the general structure of American corporate governance and 
noting that employees have “no role”). 
 11. For a comprehensive rundown, see Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in America at Work: 
The History of Labor’s Vote in Corporate Governance, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 697 (2019). 
 12. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156, § 23 (2020); see McGaughey, supra note 11, at 718.  
 13. See McGaughey, supra note 11, at 718–19. 
 14. Brian Hamer, Note, Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards 
of Directors, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 639, 639 (1981) (“Employee representation on corporate boards 
of directors is not a new idea in the United States.”). 
 15. Id. (“Union and business leaders in this country, however, have consistently opposed 
employee representation, favoring instead exclusive reliance on the adversarial process of 
collective bargaining.”). 
 16. McGaughey, supra note 11, at 729–30. 
 17. Davison Douglas, Note, Labor Unions in the Boardroom: An Antitrust Dilemma, 92 
YALE L.J. 106, 106 n.1 (1982). 
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was elected at Pan American Airways in 1982.18 Chrysler’s board seat 
for the union president ended in 1991 but was then revived when it was 
purchased by the German corporation Daimler-Benz.19 
The only other significant instances of employee board representation 
came through instances of employee ownership. Employee ownership 
refers to ownership structures through which employees hold a 
significant or majority stake in the enterprise. Workers could, of course, 
simply buy up the stock in their employer individually, assuming that the 
shares are publicly sold.20 But the capital required to acquire a meaningful 
percentage of equity is well beyond most employees’ means. Instead, 
different vehicles have been developed to facilitate employee 
participation in ownership. 
The most common set of ownership vehicles fall under the category 
of ESOPs—employee stock ownership plans.21 Rather than individual 
holders, the ESOP provides an investment vehicle that holds a controlling 
equity stake in the company.22 Essentially, a chunk of the employer’s 
equity is transferred to the plan, and the plan pays back the corporation 
for the value of the shares.23 Most ESOPs fund the purchase of stock 
through debt that is secured through the stock as well as a pledge from 
the employer.24 Employees participate in the ESOP not as shareholders 
but as beneficiaries. Because an ESOP plan falls under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),25 it provides tax 
benefits, as well as fiduciary obligations, to its participants—the 
employees.26 Publix Super Markets, the largest employee-owned 
company in the United States, is owned by employees through an ESOP 
as well as the company’s 401(k) plan.27 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. See STEPHEN J. SILVIA, ORGANIZING GERMAN AUTOMOBILE PLANTS IN THE USA 15 
(2016). Although framed as a “merger of equals,” Chrysler was subsumed into Daimler-Benz and 
fell under the German laws of codetermination. See BILL VLASIC & BRADLEY A. STERTZ, TAKEN 
FOR A RIDE: HOW DAIMLER-BENZ DROVE OFF WITH CHRYSLER 238 (2000). 
 20. Federal securities regulations would complicate matters if the employees constitute an 
investment group. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1), (2). 
 21. Robert Hockett, Why (Only) ESOPs?, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 84, 88 (2006) (“In 
speaking of ESOPs (or ‘plans’), one can be speaking of any of several distinct, cognate kinds of 
financial arrangement.”). For an overview of different ESOP types, see JOSEPH RAPHAEL BLASI, 
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 64–84 (1988). 
 22. Hockett, supra note 21, at 88–89. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). 
 26. 29 U.S.C. § 1107; Hockett, supra note 21, at 88–94. 
 27. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215, 228 
(2013). 
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Although ESOPs may appear to provide employees with participation 
in governance through ownership, the reality is much more removed. 
Because ESOPs are trusts, they are controlled and managed by trustees 
on behalf of the beneficiaries. Trustees control voting rights over the 
shares and need only vote in the employees’ interests as beneficiaries of 
the trust.28 This means that trustees need only try to maximize the value 
of the shares by pursuing traditional corporate governance strategies; 
there is no duty to workers qua workers.29 Because of this structure, 
management officials have used ESOPs to secure their own power against 
hostile takeovers without providing any real voice to employees.30 
Nonetheless, there are few examples of ESOPs in which employee 
representatives participated on the corporate board. In some cases, unions 
have pursued that representation.31 In the mid-1990s, United Airlines 
restructured itself through an ESOP purchase of 55% of the company.32 
As part of the transaction, which was negotiated with unions representing 
the pilots and the machinists, union representatives filled two of the 
twelve directors’ seats.33 That meant that along with one other employee 
director representing non-union management and administrative 
employees, worker directors only held a quarter of the board, despite the 
 
 28. See Matthew M. O’Toole, Comment, The Disproportionate Effects of an ESOP’s 
Proportional Voting, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 824, 828 (1991). 
 29. See Jedidiah J. Kroncke, ESOPs and the Limits of Fractionalized Ownership, 2017 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 287, 297 (“For public companies, ESOP employees could vote their shares as 
would normal stock owners, but for privately held companies, as were and are the majority of 
ESOPs, the trustee controlled the voting power of unallocated and allocated shares alike, except 
on issues of corporate sales or ownership realignments.”). 
 30. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and 
Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann and Other 
“Survivalists,” 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 957, 960 (1998) (“Because an ESOP can provide significant 
tax advantages to a company that needs increased cash flow, an employer can create an ESOP 
that owns a majority of the company but gives employees virtually no voice in managerial policy-
making.” (footnote omitted)); Julie Lynn Kaufman, Democratic ESOPs: Can Workers Control 
Their Future?, 5 LAB. LAW. 825, 825 (1989) (arguing that “the majority of ESOPs are structured 
to skew stock ownership heavily towards management” and “ESOP trusts thus become a means 
of perpetuating and entrenching current managerial control”). 
 31. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing 
Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 78 (1988) (“Unions also have 
tried to obtain direct ownership in corporations through the creation of employee stock option 
plans with employee stock trusts, so as to have direct input into corporate decisions.”). 
 32. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employee Stock Ownership in Economic Transitions: The Case of 
United Airlines, 10 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1998, at 52. 
 33. Id. at 54 (“The board consist[ed] of [twelve] members: five ‘public directors,’ four 
‘independent directors,’ two ‘union directors,’ and one ‘salaried and management’ director (the 
latter three directors known collectively as ‘employee directors’).”). 
328 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
ESOP’s majority stake.34 United filed for bankruptcy in 2002, and the 
ESOP was ultimately dismantled.35 
Workers cooperatives are another way to operationalize employee 
ownership.36 Cooperatives are businesses owned and run by (and for) 
their members, and worker cooperatives limit their membership to 
employees.37 Like corporations, cooperatives are formed under state 
statutes.38 Unlike corporations, however, which are structured for 
shareholder governance, worker cooperatives are specifically designed to 
provide employee governance.39 Each member of the cooperative 
participates in management decisions and receives income distributions 
along the lines of a traditional owner.40 These governance rights are not 
transferable and terminate once the employee leaves employment.41 
Because worker cooperatives must forego outside capital investment, 
they are not suited for enterprises of any substantial size and are relatively 
uncommon.42 Large cooperatives, such as Land-O-Lakes, Ace Hardware, 
and REI, tend to have a wider membership that includes consumers or 
other non-employee stakeholders.43 
Stock options have also proven a popular method to give employees a 
stake in the success of the business. Along with other types of bonus 
plans, stock options allow employees to participate in the employer’s 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Bill Fotsch & John Case, United’s Troubles Could Have Been Avoided, FORBES 
(Apr. 17, 2017, 8:54 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/fotschcase/2017/04/17/uniteds-troubles-
could-have-been-avoided/#40bea9d4c062 [https://perma.cc/66YP-PSP6]; Farhad Manjoo, 
United’s ESOP Fable, SALON (Dec. 13, 2002, 1:30 AM), 
https://www.salon.com/2002/12/12/esop/ [https://perma.cc/C8AC-95UV]. 
 36. Linda D. Phillips, Worker Cooperatives: Their Time Has Arrived, 40 COLO. LAW., Sept. 
2011, at 33. 
 37. Alicia Alvarez, Lawyers, Organizers, and Workers: Collaboration and Conflict in 
Worker Cooperative Development, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 353, 358 (2017) (“The 
International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) defines a cooperative as ‘an autonomous association 
of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and 
aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically-controlled enterprise.’”). 
 38. Lewis D. Solomon & Melissa B. Kirgis, Business Cooperatives: A Primer, 6 DEPAUL 
BUS. L.J. 233, 236 (1994). 
 39. Ariana R. Levinson, Founding Worker Cooperatives: Social Movement Theory and the 
Law, 14 NEV. L.J. 322, 325 (2014) (“The pure worker cooperative involves a legal structure in 
which each employee has one equal share in the entity and one vote.”). 
 40. Scott L. Cummings, Developing Cooperatives as a Job Creation Strategy for Low-
Income Workers, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 181, 186 (1999). 
 41. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1404 (2020); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-6.2-6 (2020). 
 42. G. Mitu Gulati, TM. Thomas Isaac & William A. Klein, When A Workers’ Cooperative 
Works: The Case of Kerala Dinesh Beedi, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1422 (2002) (“Worker 
cooperatives are appealing in many ways, but they are rare.”); Levinson, supra note 39, at 323 
(“Yet despite the promise they hold, worker cooperatives are relatively rare in the United States.”). 
 43. See David Gurnick, Cooperative Conditions, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2013, at 36, 38.  
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growth by providing profits based on increases in the share price.44 While 
proponents have touted the benefits of employee stock options for 
incentivizing an ownership culture,45 options provide no governance 
power. Voting rights are only obtained if the option is exercised, which 
requires a purchase with additional funds. Most employees only exercise 
their options to cash in on the increase and then immediately sell; they 
are not long-term holders.46 And that is probably a good thing. Investing 
in employer stock leaves the employee extremely vulnerable to the 
employer’s financial health. Workers with significant stock ownership 
are essentially doubling down on one company—the exact opposite of a 
diversification strategy recommended for personal savings.47 The 
experiences of workers at Enron, many of whom had their 401(k) plans 
deeply invested in Enron stock, illustrate the dangers of employee 
holdings of employer shares.48 
Although putting one’s own pension in employer stock is dangerous 
business, retirement funds are invested in a variety of mutual funds, index 
funds, and other financial vehicles representing trillions of dollars.49 
When these funds are managed by unions, they can exert a strong 
presence on corporate governance issues. Labor pension funds, especially 
large public-sector funds run by the California Public Employee’s 
Retirement System (CalPERS) and the American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), have led the way in 
efforts to strengthen shareholder voting rights, rein in the power of the 
CEO, and fight fraud and abuse by insiders.50 However, they have made 
 
 44. Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and Rule 
10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 546–47 (2003). 
 45. See, e.g., JOSEPH BLASI,  DOUGLAS KRUSE & AARON BERNSTEIN, IN THE COMPANY OF 
OWNERS: THE TRUTH ABOUT STOCK OPTIONS (AND WHY EVERY EMPLOYEE SHOULD HAVE THEM) 
139–44 (2003). 
 46. Id. at 81 (noting that employees own a “much smaller amount” of actual stock than their 
stock options). 
 47. The problem of lack of diversification is an endemic problem to employee ownership. 
See Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159, 207 (1991) (“Risk 
diversification is thus in both theory and practice the most serious problem with employee 
ownership as now practiced in the United States.”). 
 48. Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension System?, 
11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 305, 313 (2007) (“[T]he publicity associated with the disaster befalling 
participants in the 401(k) plans of companies like Enron and Global Crossing have not resulted in 
a significant decline in the amount of assets invested in employer securities.”). 
 49. DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER, at xii (2018) (putting 
the valuation of worker pension funds at $3 to $6 trillion). 
 50. Id. at 45–78, 111–51, 172. 50. Id at 45–78, 111–51, 172. For an argument that union 
pension funds should promote codetermination through their own private equity funds, see Joseph 
Baron, Codetermination and Pension Fund Direct Investment, REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3753841. 
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no play for a direct role in governance through board representation.51 In 
examining the behavior of these funds as shareholders, researchers have 
found not “a socialist or proletarian plot” but rather “a model for any large 
institutional investor attempting to maximize return on capital.”52 Actual 
directors’ seats are not on the agenda, at least in the near term. 
Despite their relative absence from the economic scene, worker 
directors are now very much in the policy spotlight. Both Senator Tammy 
Baldwin and Senator Elizabeth Warren have introduced bills that would 
provide for worker representation on boards. Senator Warren’s 
Accountable Capitalism Act would provide for 40% employee board 
representation for companies that have more than $1 billion in gross 
receipts;53 Senator Baldwin’s bill would provide for a third of the board-
to-worker representation for all publicly listed companies.54 These bills 
reflect public sentiment supportive of employee participation in corporate 
governance.55 Worker protest movements, such as the one at Google, 
have included board representation on their list of demands.56 And at a 
recent presidential debate, Senator Bernie Sanders defended his proposal 
for worker representation against claims of “communism.”57 Such 
proposals remain, at present, only proposals. But the absolute control that 
shareholders have over corporate governance is falling into contestation. 
  
 
 51. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: 
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1024 (1998). 
 52. Id. at 1019–20. 
 53. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. §§ 2(2)(A), 6(b) (2018); see 
Matthew Yglesias, Elizabeth Warren Has a Plan to Save Capitalism, VOX (Aug. 15, 
2018, 11:05 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/15/17683022/elizabeth-warren-accountable-
capitalism-corporations [https://perma.cc/4ADN-FNLP]. 
 54. Reward Work Act, S. 915, 116th Cong. § 3(c)(2) (2019); Reward Work Act, H.R. 6096, 
115th Cong. § 3(c)(2) (2018); see McGaughey, supra note 11, at 698–99. 
 55. Dylan Matthews, Workers Don’t Have Much Say in Corporations. Why Not Give Them 
Seats on the Board?, VOX (Apr. 6, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/6/170 
86720/poll-corporate-board-democracy-worker-council-codetermination-union-labor (“A poll of 
more than 3,300 American likely voters by Civis Analytics finds that a majority (53 percent) 
would support allowing employees at large companies to elect representatives to those companies’ 
boards of directors, thus giving employees a direct, democratic say in how the company is run.”). 
 56. Noam Scheiber, Google Workers Reject Silicon Valley Individualism in Walkout, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/business/google-employee-
walkout-labor.html [https://perma.cc/WLG4-DTFA]. 
 57. Full Transcript: Ninth Democratic Debate in Las Vegas, NBC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2020, 
12:08 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/full-transcript-ninth-democratic-
debate-las-vegas-n1139546 [https://perma.cc/X4AF-4GFJ] (stating that Sen. Sanders said, “I 
want workers to be able to sit on corporate boards, as well, so they can have some say over what 
happens to their lives,” and that Mayor Bloomberg called the proposal “ridiculous” and that it 
represented “communism”). 
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B.  German Codetermination 
Many European countries give employees some degree of access to 
corporate boards.58 But the German system of codetermination offers the 
most robust protection of employee representation. German 
codetermination has also been in place for decades as part of a large, 
modern economy, making it the obvious exemplar of such a system.59 
The term “codetermination” has been used to describe two different 
features of German economic life.60 “Social codetermination” involves 
employee representation on shop-level works councils at all companies 
with at least five employees.61 The works councils have a broad range of 
rights in the workplace, ranging from the right to receive economic and 
financial information to the right of consultation on matters relating to 
the organization and structure of jobs to the power to negotiate work 
agreements.62 “Supervisory codetermination,” on the other hand, 
describes employee representation at the level of the corporate board.63 
Thus, it is of greater interest here.  
Supervisory codetermination laws dictate the composition of the 
boards of directors for large German companies.64 Unlike the United 
States, Germany uses a two-tiered corporate board structure.65 The 
supervisory board provides more general oversight of the company and 
 
 58. For a recent list of countries, see Ewan McGaughey, Votes at Work in Britain: 
Shareholder Monopolisation and the “Single Channel,” 47 INDUS. L.J. 76, 79 & n.17, 80 fig.1 
(2018). 
 59. See Robert Scholz & Sigurt Vitols, Board-level Codetermination: A Driving Force for 
Corporate Social Responsibility in German Companies?, 25 EUR. J. INDUS. RELS. 233, 233–34 
(2019). The Works Constitution Act covered companies that employ between 500 and 2,000 
workers, while the Codetermination Act of 1976 governs companies with over 2,000 workers. See 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] [Works Constitution Act of 1952], Oct. 11, 1952, 
BUNDESGSETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 681 (Ger.); see also Mitbestimmungsgsetz [MitbestG] 
[Codetermination Act of 1976], May 4, 1976, BUNDESGSETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1153 
(Ger.). The 1952 Act was supplanted by the One-Third Participation Act of 2004, which requires 
that German companies that employ between 500 and 2,000 workers must grant them 1/3 of their 
board seats. §§ 1 & 4 Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz [DrittelbG] [One-Third Participation Act], May 
18, 2004, BUNDESGSETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBl I] at 974 (Ger.). 
 60. Here, we are using the terminology from Otto Sandrock & Jean J. du Plessis, The 
German System of Supervisory Codetermination by Employees, in GERMAN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 167, 169 (Jean J. du Plessis et al. eds., 
3d ed. 2017). 
 61. See id. at 169–71. 
 62. See JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMICS OF CODETERMINATION 16–19 (2009). 
 63. See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 60, at 169. 
 64. See id. at 172–78.  
 65. See Jean J. du Plessis et al., An Overview of German Business or Enterprise Law and 
the One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems Contrasted, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 60, at 1, 8–13. 
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appoints the members of the management board.66 The management 
board runs the company, directing resources and making the day-to-day 
business decisions.67 Management boards of larger companies also have 
a personnel director responsible for all matters relating to labor 
relations.68 The supervisory board is thus more analogous to the 
American board of directors, while the officers in U.S. corporations share 
many of the responsibilities of the management board.69 
The degree of supervisory codetermination on German corporate 
boards depends on the type of industry, the number of employees, and a 
few other factors.70 Corporations with fewer than 500 employees have 
supervisory board members elected solely by shareholders.71 However, 
corporations with 500 to 2,000 employees typically have one-third of 
their board members elected by employees (called, unsurprisingly, one-
third board parity), and companies with more than 2,000 employees have 
one-half of their supervisory board members elected by employees.72 In 
most of these large companies with one-half codetermination, employees 
enjoy “quasi-parity” because shareholders elect the chair (and potential 
tiebreaker vote).73 In the coal, iron, and steel industries, however, there is 
 
 66. See Jean J. du Plessis & Ingo Saenger, The Supervisory Board as Company Organ, in 
GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 60, 
at 105, 133–53; Jean J. du Plessis & Ingo Saenger, The General Meeting and the Management 
Board as Company Organs, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 60, at 63, 73 [hereinafter du Plessis & Saenger, General 
Meeting]. 
 67. du Plessis & Saenger, General Meeting, supra note 66, at 72. Generally speaking, the 
two-tiered boards are probably better at supervising top employees because there are fewer of the 
conflicts of interest that occur when managers are on the corporate board; without those managers, 
though, information may flow to the supervisory board more sluggishly. 
 68. See Otto Sandrock, German and International Perspectives of the German Model of 
Codetermination, 26 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 129, 131 (2015). Depending on the level of 
codetermination (discussed below) the personnel director has the support of the employee 
representatives of the supervisory board. For full-parity codetermination governed by the 1952 
law, employee representatives have veto power over the appointment of the personnel director; 
for companies with quasi-parity codetermination, personnel directors are usually not appointed 
unless they enjoy the support of the employee representatives. Id. at 131–32. 
 69. See Thilo Kuntz, German Corporate Law in the 20th Century, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 205, 233 (Harwell Wells ed., 2018) 
(discussing how supervisory directors had traditionally been part-time positions somewhat 
removed from day-to-day governance but have recently stepped up their oversight roles). 
 70. See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 60, at 182–83. 
 71. Jean J. du Plessis & Ingo Saenger, An Overview of the Corporate Governance Debate 
in Germany, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, 
supra note 60, at 17, 48–49. 
 72. Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 60, at 175–78; see du Plessis & Saenger, supra note 
71, at 48–49; ADDISON, supra note 62, at 103; Sandrock, supra note 68, at 131–32.  
 73. Sandrock, supra note 68, at 131–32. 
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a neutral chair (and tiebreaker), giving the employees “full parity,” or a 
truly shared system of governance.74  
Volkswagen workers have a unique arrangement, one that takes 
codetermination to the next level. Originally a project of the German 
government during the Nazi era, the company was transferred into private 
hands in 1960.75 As part of the transfer, the government passed a special 
“Volkswagen Law” that gave seats on the supervisory board to the local 
government of Lower Saxony.76 Because the government directors 
tended to side with the employees, Volkswagen has a de facto worker 
majority.77 
Over the last thirty years, Germany has followed certain international 
trends in corporate governance: directors on supervisory boards have 
become more professionalized and less insular; banks and insurance 
companies do not quite have the same dominant shareholdings that they 
once had; and legislation has required heightened auditing standards and 
shareholder rights.78 But the movement—predicted by some—towards a 
shareholder primacy model has not materialized. Rather, the 2008 
financial crisis slowed, or even reversed, efforts to bring Germany closer 
to the Anglo-American system.79 Germany’s particular style of 
 
 74. See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 60, at 173–74. This is true of companies in these 
sectors at a lower threshold—1000 instead of 2000 employees. Id. at 173 & n.31. 
 75. Erik Werlauff, Safeguards Against Takeover After Volkswagen – On the Lawfulness of 
Such Safeguards Under Company Law After the European Court’s Decision in “Volkswagen,” 
20 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 101, 103 (2009).  
 76. Gesetz über die Überführung der Anteilsrechte an der Volkswagenwerk Gesellschaft 
mit beschränkter Haftung in private Hand [VWGmbHÜG] [Volkswagen Law], July 21, 1960, 
BUNDESGESTZBLATT [BGBL I] at 585, last amended by Gesetz zur Umsetzung der 
Aktionärsrechterichtlinie [ARUG], July 30, 2009, BGBL I at 2493, art. 14c (Ger.), 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/vwgmbh_g/BJNR005850960.html [https://perma.cc/NRR5-
2RDF]; see Nicola Faith Sharpe, Volkswagen’s Bad Decisions & Harmful Emissions: How Poor 
Process Corrupted Codetermination in Germany’s Dual Board Structure, 7 MICH. BUS. & 
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 49, 62 (2017).  
 77. Sharpe, supra note 76, at 66, 75. In addition, individual Volkswagen shareholders were 
limited to a maximum of 20% of the voting rights. Id. at 62. In 2007, this limitation was overturned 
by the European Union Court of Justice as a violation of the free movement of capital within the 
E.U. See Case C-112/05, Comm’n v. Fed. Republic of Ger., ECLI:EU:C:2007:623, ¶¶ 30, 56, 82 
(Oct. 23, 2007); Sharpe, supra note 76, at 62. In response, Volkswagen changed its charter in 
2009 to give directors certain veto powers over plant closures and layoffs. Sharpe, supra note 76, 
at 62. For additional discussion of Volkswagen’s unique governance, which incorporates a two-
tiered board on corporate decision-making, see id. at 59; JACK EWING, FASTER, HIGHER, FARTHER: 
THE VOLKSWAGEN SCANDAL 57 (2017). See generally Peer Zumbansen & Daniel Saam, The ECJ, 
Volkswagen and European Corporate Law: Reshaping the European Varieties of Capitalism, 8 
GERMAN L.J. 1027 (2007) (discussing the impact of Case C-112/05 on European corporate 
governance). 
 78. Kuntz, supra note 69, at 233. 
 79. See Andreas Rühmkorf, Felix Spindler & Navajyoti Samanta, Evolution of German 
Corporate Governance (1995–2014): An Empirical Analysis, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE 1042, 1043 
(2019).  
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codetermination remains solidly entrenched within the German economic 
system, as well as the European and international political economy. 
II.  CODETERMINATION IN THEORY 
So, what have American corporate law scholars made of this 
alternative version of corporate governance, which actually exists in flesh 
and blood on German supervisory boards? For decades, codetermination 
has received little more than passing attention from corporate governance 
scholars.80 It is rarely given the kind of in-depth treatment that a fully 
functioning, alternative model of corporate governance would seem to 
demand.81 Instead, American corporate law scholars have spent much of 
the last fifty years focused on shareholder primacy. 
A.  The Hegemony of Shareholder Primacy 
Shareholder primacy has been the dominant corporate governance 
model in the United States for decades.82 The basic corporate structure—
where shareholders elect the directors, who in turn select the officers to 
run the corporation—replicates itself in corporations from every state.83 
While there are some variations in governance structures, both among 
actual corporations and in the guise of potential reforms, this corporate 
form has remained relatively stable over the last century. Its critical 
governance feature—who gets to vote, about what, and under what 
circumstances—has also been fixed: the corporate franchise belongs to 
shareholders and shareholders alone.84 And shareholder governance is 
not limited to board elections. In fact, shareholders have voting rights to 
amend the corporation’s charter and its bylaws;85 transformative 
 
 80. See, e.g., CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 295–96 (Lucian Arye Bebchuk 
ed., 1990) (referencing codetermination once in passing); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 69 (1991) (referencing codetermination 
once in passing); HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 110–12 (1996) (discussing 
codetermination for a few pages); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 47–49 (2008) (discussing codetermination for a few pages, though the 
author wrote a couple of earlier articles on what he called “participatory management”); 
JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 230 (2008) (referencing the German system in 
passing). 
 81. One refreshing exception is EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163–235 
(Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999). 
 82. Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 
J. CORP. L. 975, 977 (2006). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951, 1994 
(2018). 
 85. Generally, the board of directors must first propose an amendment to the charter, and 
then the shareholders must approve the amendment. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). In Delaware, the amendment must be approved by a majority of all shares 
outstanding rather than just a majority of shares voting. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2020). 
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corporate decisions—such as mergers, certain acquisitions, and 
dissolution (i.e., the end of the corporation)—also require shareholder 
approval.86 From start to finish, shareholders call the shots in American 
corporate law. 
Over time, scholars have developed an intellectual framework 
supporting this central role that shareholders play in corporate 
governance. As they developed the framework, the role of shareholders 
within the corporation evolved from that of absentee landlords to the 
focus of the entire enterprise. The resulting theory of shareholder primacy 
has redesigned both the purpose and function of the corporation to 
revolve around shareholder wealth maximization.87 And the shareholder 
primacy norm, a familiar notion even to nonlawyers, now has wide 
acceptance in both theory and practice.88   
The main scholarly justifications for the central control feature of 
shareholder primacy—the exclusive shareholder franchise—were 
generated in the latter part of the twentieth century. One model describes 
the corporation as a nexus of freely bargained contracts among all 
corporate constituents, and therefore shareholder primacy is 
presumptively the most efficient way to structure firm governance.89 
Another argument is that shareholders are owners of the corporate 
residual and therefore have the appropriate incentives to make good firm 
decisions.90 The right to the residual provides shareholders with a 
common interest in maximizing corporate profits, which reduces their 
tendency to squabble about firm decisions and thereby promotes 
efficiency.91 This homogeneous interest in profits also eliminates the 
possibility of destructive voting cycles, à la Arrow’s theorem.92 
 
 86. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 222–25 (11th 
ed. 2010) (describing different types of mergers and acquisitions). 
 87. Bodie, supra note 82, at 977 (“This [shareholder primacy] norm is much more than a 
descriptive account of shareholders’ rights; it is instead a normative judgment on the most socially 
efficient way of organizing the economy.”). 
 88. See, e.g., Rhee, supra note 84, at 1956 (“Shareholder primacy . . .  is said to be a 
fundamental tenet of corporate law.”). 
 89. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 9–10 (2002) (“The dominant model of the corporation in legal scholarship is the so-called 
nexus of contracts theory.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) (“The corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit 
contracts, and corporate law enables the participants to select the optimal arrangement for the 
many different sets of risks and opportunities that are available in a large economy.”). 
 90. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 80, at 67–68 (justifying the corporate franchise 
based on shareholders’ interests in the residual). 
 91. See id. at 68–70. 
 92. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 395, 405 (1983) (discussing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 
(2d ed. 1963)). 
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We have routinely questioned these traditional arguments for the 
shareholder franchise. The nexus of contracts model of the corporation is 
an entirely fictitious account of the corporation and its constituents, and 
tells us very little about the choices that actual shareholders and other 
corporate constituents would make in the absence of various 
constraints.93 The argument based on the residual is undercut by the 
growing realization that shareholders do not have a common interest in 
wealth maximization but instead have interests that diverge along a 
number of dimensions.94 As a result, scholars are losing trust in 
shareholders with significant power,95 and there is even support for 
nonvoting shares and passive shareholding.96 Those who support 
strengthened shareholder power are even accused of supporting special 
interests and shadow agendas.97 And the argument based on Arrow’s 
 
 93. See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Voting and the Symbolic 
Politics of Corporation as Contract, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 556–57 (2018) (“The whole 
notion of the corporation as a nexus of contracts has been a theatrical production of dodges, feints, 
and posturing designed to rationalize and justify the existing order of things and used by corporate 
governance theorists to create the kind of rhetorical space they need to advocate for their own 
particular policy positions.”). 
 94. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Essay, Principal Costs: A New Theory for 
Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 791 (2017) (describing “several 
sources of conflict among shareholders, including differing investment horizons and needs for 
cash payouts, empty voting, and competing outside interests” (footnotes omitted)); Grant M. 
Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder 
Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 477–98 (2008) (finding that “corporations are not simply 
a mass of like-minded individuals who are all voting based upon the same self-interest,” because 
each shareholder has a variety of interests that conflict with those of others); Iman Anabtawi, 
Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 577–93 (2006) 
(discussing “five schisms that place the interests of some shareholders in conflict with those of 
other shareholders”). 
 95. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2008) (“[A]ctivist shareholders are using their growing influence not to 
improve overall firm performance, as has generally been assumed, but to profit at other 
shareholders’ expense.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1750–51 (2006) (“[S]hareholder voting is properly 
understood not as a primary component of the corporate decisionmaking structure, but rather as 
an accountability device of last resort, to be used sparingly, at most.”). 
 96. See Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STAN. 
L. REV. 687, 697–98 (2019) (arguing that in addition to issuing stock with voting rights, companies 
should also issue nonvoting stock because it will “reduce agency costs by making management 
more accountable to its informed investors while minimizing the transaction costs associated with 
voting”); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 497 
(2018) (arguing that passive funds should not have voting rights). 
 97. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 95, at 1754 (claiming that Lucian Bebchuk’s argument 
for shareholder empowerment would help “precisely the institutions most likely to use their 
position to self-deal—that is, to take a non-pro rata share of the firm’s assets and earnings—or 
otherwise to reap private benefits not shared with other investors”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Essay, Can 
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theorem, with its prediction of firm-destroying voting cycles, was 
nonsensical from the very beginning.98  
While it may seem an ideal time to examine alternatives to the 
traditional model, competing corporate law theories have not filled this 
gap. Board primacy theories may do a better job describing the actual 
relationship between shareholders and the board of directors,99 or better 
take into account the many participants in the life of a corporation,100 but 
they fall back upon the traditional arguments to support the retention of 
the exclusive shareholder franchise.101 Stakeholder theories propose that 
corporate governance should take all stakeholders into account,102 but 
they lack a model for allocating governance rights and responsibilities 
among the participants.103 Shareholder primacy still reigns supreme in 
corporate governance theory. 
The triumph of shareholder primacy seemed so complete that it 
prompted Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman to declare 
 
We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological 
Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 451 (2014) (“Bebchuk is the sincere 
champion of one group of ‘agents’ wielding power and authority over others’ money—the money 
managers who control most of the investments belonging ultimately to ordinary Americans who 
are saving to pay for their retirements and for their children’s education—against another group 
of ‘agents’ that he believes is somehow more conflicted—the agents who actually manage 
corporations that make real products and deliver useful services (i.e. ‘productive corporations’).”). 
 98. See Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder 
Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (2009) (contending that arguments based on Arrow’s 
theorem “overestimate[] the concerns raised by the theorem about aggregation of more diverse 
preferences,” and “misread[] the import of the theorem—namely, that any voting system will fail 
to achieve perfection, and thus we must confront the weaknesses of the particular system at 
hand”). 
 99. See generally BAINBRIDGE, supra note 80 (arguing that a corporation’s board of 
directors holds ultimate control of the corporation because it is not merely an agent of the 
shareholders but serves as the nexus for all of the contracts that make up a corporation). 
 100. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 278 (1999) (arguing that “a public corporation is a team of people who enter 
into a complex agreement to work together for their mutual gain” and includes shareholders, 
employees, creditors, and the local community as participants). 
 101. For an overview and critical evaluation of the various forms of board primacy theory, 
see generally Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn 
Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071 (2010). 
 102. See David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform 
Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORP. L. 1, 11–12 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (discussing efforts 
to provide protections to nonshareholder constituencies); Blair & Stout, supra note 100, at 293–
94 (arguing that directors owe a duty to the corporation and that the corporation consists of all of 
the stakeholders who are responsible for the business of the enterprise). 
 103. See Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 605, 611 (2009) (arguing that stakeholder theory fails to provide a system of mechanisms 
for governance, other than “balancing” stakeholder concerns); Joseph Heath, Business Ethics 
Without Stakeholders, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 533, 543 (2006) (arguing that stakeholder theory creates 
“extraordinary agency risks” because of the potential for conflicts). 
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the end of corporate law history. “There is no longer any serious 
competitor,” they claimed, “to the view that corporate law should 
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”104 And, to this 
day, shareholder primacy remains the dominant model of corporate 
governance in the United States and retains a hammerlock on corporate 
legal scholarship. It remains an unspoken, seemingly self-evident truth 
about corporations. 
B.  Codetermination in American Legal Scholarship 
The deep commitment that American legal scholars have to 
shareholder primacy has obvious implications for their views of 
codetermination. Arguments in favor of the exclusive shareholder 
franchise are necessarily arguments against any system of shared 
governance. So, in a sense, the scholarly community’s assessment of 
German codetermination lurks beneath the surface of these broader 
commitments. And given the stranglehold that shareholder primacy has 
over American legal scholarship, that assessment, though rarely explored 
at any length, is largely a negative one.  
With very few exceptions, corporate law scholars tend to focus on one 
particular aspect of the German system of codetermination: the fact that 
it is mandated by law. That, coupled with the absence of corporate boards 
with employee representatives in the United States, is viewed by the 
scholars as proof positive that their theoretical arguments for shareholder 
primacy—and, more specifically, for the exclusive shareholder 
franchise—are on the money.  
Their argument here is a variant of the contractarian argument for the 
exclusive shareholder franchise. This version is as follows: If 
codetermination is so great, then firms would voluntarily adopt it. But 
American firms have not done so. Codetermination, therefore, is not that 
great and, in fact, is less efficient than the method of governance chosen 
in the United States, with corporate boards elected by shareholders alone. 
In fact, the only way a firm would end up with employee representation 
on its board is if you mandate it, as Germany does by law. In short, 
nobody freely chooses codetermination, thus it is less efficient than 
having shareholders run the show. 
A wide range of legal scholars have made versions of this argument 
that codetermination must be inefficient because it has not been 
voluntarily adopted by firms.105 Professor Stephen Bainbridge, for 
 
 104. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001). 
 105. For a discussion of this argument in broader theoretical context, see ADDISON, supra 
note 62, at 104–08. 
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example, has made a number of arguments against shared governance.106 
Those more general arguments—which largely spring from his views 
about the corporation as a nexus of contracts, his application of Kenneth 
Arrow’s distinction between consensus and authority decision-making, 
and his reasons for advancing board primacy—have been critiqued 
elsewhere.107 More specifically, though, Bainbridge notes that voluntary 
adoption of codetermination is “very rare.”108 Instead, shared governance 
is usually adopted by national legislation.109 The German system, for 
example, was created by “sweeping statutory mandates.”110 For 
Bainbridge, this lack of voluntary adoption reinforces his other arguments 
against shared governance, for “[in] the absence of any documented 
market failure, it is fair to infer from this evidence that codetermination 
is less efficient than the Anglo-American tradition of excluding workers 
from board representation.”111 
Professor George Dent makes a similar argument with respect to the 
broader concept of stakeholder representation (though he mostly focuses 
on employees).112 As he explains, “Apart from economic theory, there is 
another and perhaps more telling problem with the stakeholder concept: 
If stakeholder governance can produce a bigger pie, and a larger piece for 
each constituency, why has it not happened through private 
arrangements?”113 Dent likens the absence of shared governance systems 
to “the dog that did not bark” in the Silver Blaze, a story in which 
Sherlock Holmes solves a crime by noting that a dog’s silence shows that 
the intruder was an insider.114 For Dent, there are few voluntarily adopted 
systems of codetermination—the dogs are not barking—and that 
indicates something important about the purported benefits of the system.  
 
 106. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An 
Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1054–55 (1998) [hereinafter 
Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 722–23 (1996).  
 107. See, e.g., Hayden & Bodie, supra note 93, at 530–46 (critiquing the nexus of contracts 
view of corporations); Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A 
Review of The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139, 143 
(2009) (critiquing his applications of Arrow’s views on consensus and authority in decision-
making); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 101, at 2089–90 (critiquing the relationship between the 
arguments for board primacy and those for the exclusive shareholder franchise). 
 108. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management, supra note 106, at 1054. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 1054–55. 
 112. See George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse, 58 CASE 
W. RSRV. L. REV. 1107, 1115–16 (2008). 
 113. Id. at 1115. This particular argument elides the possibility that codetermination might 
produce a bigger overall pie without producing a larger piece for every constituency.  
 114. Id. at 1115–16. 
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Professor Roberta Romano approaches the issue in a similar fashion, 
though she expands her list of silent dogs to include state governments.115 
“It is questionable,” she says, “whether such worker representation 
provisions enhance shareholder value. If they did, one would expect U.S. 
states and firms to opt for such arrangements . . . .”116 In other words, 
market forces would lead both corporations and state governments to 
adopt shared governance were it perceived to increase share value. And 
to top it off, she adds that though the German codetermination model is 
available in France, almost no French firms have adopted it.117 
Hansmann and Kraakman make a similar point.118 After discussing a 
range of potential advantages to employee representation, they (along 
with their coauthors, Professors Luca Enriques and Mariana Pargendler) 
nevertheless end with these questions: “[I]f large efficiencies result from 
codetermination, why do the parties fail to contract for labor directors 
voluntarily and divide the surplus? Why do we seldom see labor directors 
where they are not mandated by law?”119 While there may be cultural 
explanations, the authors note that “a competing explanation is that the 
costs of labor representation exceed its benefits, or at least are feared to 
do so.”120 Elsewhere, Hansmann and Kraakman note, “The growing view 
today is that meaningful direct worker voting participation in corporate 
affairs tends to produce inefficient decisions, paralysis, or weak boards, 
and that these costs are likely to exceed any potential benefits that worker 
participation might bring.”121 
So this argument has been made by Bainbridge, Dent, Romano, 
Hansmann, and Kraakman in the 1990s through the early 2000s. But it 
may have been first (and in any case, most forcefully) made by Michael 
Jensen and William Meckling in the late 1970s.122 “Without fiat,” they 
flatly claimed, “codetermination would be virtually nonexistent.”123 They 
then backed up this argument with a prediction: German codetermination 
would soon devolve into a system in which either shareholders or 
 
 115. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 129–30 (1993). 
 116. Id. at 130. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Renier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, The 
Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies, in THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 79, 106 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017); see also 
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 104, at 445. 
 119. Enriques et al., supra note 118, at 106. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 104, at 445. 
 122. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An 
Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 469, 473–75, 503–04 
(1979). 
 123. Id. at 473. 
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employees had complete control.124 If the former, then codetermination 
would just go away and be replaced by the shareholder control that 
dominates the landscape in the United States.125 If, however, employees 
succeed in controlling firms, then the German economy would grind to a 
halt like Tito’s Yugoslavia, with “fairly complete, if not total, state 
ownership of the productive assets in the economy.”126  
Some forty years later, Jensen and Meckling’s prediction looks 
laughable. German codetermination remains in place and is an important 
aspect of the country’s robust economy. More recently, Professors Jens 
Dammann and Horst Eidenmüller have taken a different tack: they argue 
that while codetermination might work in Germany, it is a “poor fit” with 
the United States.127 Specifically, they argue that certain aspects of the 
German economy—such as robust unions, protections against unjust 
terminations, and a slower market for corporate control—make 
codetermination work better in Germany than it would in the United 
States.128 Thus, even conceding that “mandatory codetermination may 
well be an efficient choice for German firms, there are compelling 
reasons to believe that its adoption would be less desirable for the United 
States.”129 
C.  Shortcomings in Codetermination Scholarship 
There are a number of shortcomings in the way in which American 
corporate law scholars use German codetermination to make their case 
for shareholder voting. Initially, their arguments are based on a flawed 
understanding of how German codetermination actually came into 
existence. In addition, they largely overlook the many possible reasons 
individual firms might not voluntarily adopt a system of employee 
representation despite the fact that it may lead to overall welfare gains 
(and perhaps even gains to shareholders themselves). Finally, U.S. 
scholars have yet to engage in the real debate over codetermination: the 
question of shareholder versus employee power. 
 
 124. See id. at 503. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Id. at 503–04. 
 127. Jens Dammann & Horst Eidenmüller, Codetermination: A Poor Fit for U.S. 
Corporations, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 870, 877. See also Jeremy A. Trimble, 
Codetermination: A Viable Strategy for the United States?, 29 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 169, 
196 (2020) (also suggesting codetermination would be a poor fit, due to dispersed shareholder 
ownership). Cf. Pierre J. Allegaert, Codetermination and Esg: Viable Alternatives to Shareholder 
Primacy?, 52 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641, 681–82 (2020) (comparing the costs and benefits of 
codetermination and ESG approaches). 
 128. See id. at 29–37. 
 129. Id. at 68. 
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1.  The Origins of German Codetermination 
The theoretical arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise 
have always been vulnerable to a factual rebuttal. This is especially true 
because many of the arguments trade on the disasters that would allegedly 
befall firms that deviate from the model of shareholder control. One solid 
counterexample of a firm that involved shared governance—and held its 
own, or even thrived, in the marketplace—should be enough to undercut 
even the most elaborate theoretical justification. The recent performance 
of the German economy (indeed, its continued existence) not only makes 
a mockery of Jensen and Meckling’s specific prediction, but more 
generally undermines the arguments for the exclusive shareholder 
franchise. And for that reason, Part III looks at the empirical research 
evaluating German codetermination.  
Critics have also made the more specific claim that codetermination 
is inefficient because nobody voluntarily agrees to such a system of 
corporate governance; it must, instead, be mandated. But the 
development of codetermination is not simply a story of government 
imposition.  Instead, it is a more complex interaction of firms, unions, 
and governments at a time when labor was historically empowered.  
Accounts of the creation of German codetermination highlight the role 
of private actors in moving towards a system of shared governance.  
Ewan McGaughey, a U.K. legal historian and economist, argues that 
German codetermination first arose through collective agreements and 
only later was enacted into law.130 McGaughey claims that only afterward 
did supervisory codetermination get codified into legislation.131 
Codetermination was then abolished by the Nazi Regime with a 1934 
statute,132 only to be recreated at the conclusion of World War II.133  
McGaughey’s key claim is that codetermination arose through 
consensual agreement, developed into social consensus, and later became 
embodied in the law.134 This account differs to some degree from 
traditional histories, which point to precursors of mandatory 
codetermination rules in the nineteenth century as well as the 
codetermination law enacted in 1916.135 But all of these accounts portray 
significant worker participation in governance at a variety of levels. 
Codetermination developed out of a political economy in which workers 
 
 130. See Ewan McGaughey, The Codetermination Bargains: The History of German 
Corporate and Labor Law, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 135, 154–64 (2016); id. at 155 (arguing that 
codetermination arrived at the end of World War I, “not as a law, not as a regulation, but as an 
agreement”). 
 131. See id. at 157. 
 132. See id. at 162. 
 133. See id. at 163–67. 
 134. Id. at 174. 
 135. See Kuntz, supra note 69, at 222–23. 
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demanded a greater stake in the enterprise. Why did the same bargain not 
get struck everywhere else? What was so special about Germany? 
McGaughey identifies two, relatively rare “Goldilocks” conditions that 
existed in postwar Germany: first, employees had relatively greater 
bargaining power as compared to other historical periods; and, second, 
the labor movement was unified to pursue meaningful representation at 
work.136 These two conditions made the development of codetermination 
possible.137 
Now, it might be argued that the historical rarity of these Goldilocks 
conditions makes the German example unique, ingermane to the more 
typical bargains struck by labor and capital. But a closer look at those 
conditions shows that, if anything, the opposite is true. Remember, the 
contractarian argument draws its normative force from the assumption 
that freely bargained for agreements better reflect the preferences of the 
parties.138 All things being equal, they reflect the most efficient outcome. 
But in order for this to work, the parties must actually be free to bargain. 
That freedom may be limited if the parties are in unequal bargaining 
positions (making it less likely that the weaker party is really getting what 
it wants), if one group of constituents has coordination problems (again, 
reducing their bargaining power), or if there are legal or logistical 
roadblocks to certain kinds of agreements. The contractarian argument 
for the exclusive shareholder franchise fails to account for all three of 
these issues: employees have never had equal bargaining power; U.S. 
labor unions have never represented more than one-third of private-sector 
employees and currently represent less than 7%;139 and both legal and 
logistical roadblocks make it difficult for American unions to participate 
in corporate governance.140  
 
 136. Id. at 136–37, 155, 168. 
 137. Traditional historical accounts present a more combative picture, in which employers 
succeeded in staving off codetermination legislation until the workers threatened a general strike 
in 1951. See Kuntz, supra note 69, at 225. Even under this perspective, however, it was the 
workers’ coordinated efforts that changed the underlying system. 
 138. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 93, at 531, 533, 541–42. 
 139. Press Release, Bureau of Lab. Stat., Union Members – 2019 (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL2N-86KH]; see also Barry 
T. Hirsch, Sluggish Institutions in a Dynamic World: Can Unions and Industrial Competition 
Coexist?, J. ECON. PERSPS., Winter 2008, at 153, 155–56 & fig.1. 
 140. For discussions of the legal impediments to systems of worker participation, see 
Matthew T. Bodie, Holacracy and the Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 619, 662–71 (2018); Jeffrey M. 
Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and Implementation of Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann and Other “Survivalists,” 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 957, 957–58 (1998). For an argument that the low rate of unionization within the United 
States is actually a reason not to adopt codetermination because employees will not be in as good 
a position to take advantage of the board seats, see Dammann & Eidenmüller, supra note 127, at 
30–31.  
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The Goldilocks conditions, in other words, do not reflect the 
conditions that surround the formation of U.S. corporations, but they do 
reflect the kind of rare situation that gets the contractarian arguments up 
and running and gives them their normative force. Corporate constituents 
in the presence of those conditions do not, however, hand over all 
governance authority to shareholders. They instead put both shareholder 
and employee representatives on the board. Like the actual lessons from 
Arrow’s theorem—that the presence of an oppositional electorate 
actually decreases the chance of a voting cycle141—the contractarian 
argument, if anything, ends up militating in favor of employee 
representation. When employees have greater bargaining power and are 
free of internal coordination problems, they bargain for codetermination. 
2.  The Limitations of Private Ordering 
The primary theoretical argument against the adoption of 
codetermination within the United States has been its failure to naturally 
catch on at individual companies. Under U.S. market settings, there are a 
number of reasons why codetermination may not be voluntarily 
introduced, even if it increases overall utility. First, allocation and 
distribution are not separated.142 Employees with governance rights may 
engage in rent-seeking in ways that reduce profits. Even if 
codetermination increases overall welfare, shareholders may not go for it 
because it wouldn’t advance their own interests.143 This, of course, would 
happen whether or not shareholders would actually lose out under a 
system of shared governance—so long as they believe they would lose 
out, they would not agree to such a system.  
Second, there may be information asymmetries that prevent a 
company from voluntarily introducing codetermination.144 The 
introduction of a new system of shared governance might, for example, 
send a false signal to the market that there is some problem with the firm’s 
labor-management relations that needs fixing.145 That signal could affect 
the company’s ability to raise funds, putting it at a unique 
disadvantage.146  
Third, collective action problems may prevent individual firms from 
adopting a system of shared governance. Professors David Levine and 
Laura Tyson have argued that codetermination needs to be adopted on a 
broad scale because individual firms find themselves in a prisoner’s 
 
 141. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 98, at 1238. 
 142. Simon Renaud, Dynamic Efficiency of Supervisory Board Codetermination in 
Germany, 21 LABOUR 689, 691 (2007). 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. at 691–92. 
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dilemma with regard to their existing entitlements and constituents.147 
Unilateral adoption of codetermination may lead to both wage 
compression (resulting in the loss of managerial and executive 
employees) and dismissal protections (resulting in the retention of poorly 
performing employees), disadvantaging the adopting firm in relation to 
its competitors for capital and sales.148  
Finally, there are additional reasons to think that the bargain for 
employee representation may not be struck by individual corporations—
namely, the path-dependency and network effects of the widespread 
adoption of a particular system of governance. Current systems of both 
corporate law and ownership structures are embedded in existing 
businesses and may prove resistant to change.149 Moreover, participants 
in the system grow accustomed to particular methods and models and 
must absorb transaction costs if these change.150 The depth and 
consistency of Delaware corporate law as developed over time has been 
cited as a factor in the small state’s success on the corporate law market, 
making it costly to incorporate elsewhere.151 The state’s solicitude 
towards managers and shareholders doesn’t hurt, either.152 
 
 147. See David I. Levine & Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and the 
Firm’s Environment, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY 183, 186 (Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990).  
 148. See id. at 214–19. 
 149. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate 
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129 (1999) (describing how “initial ownership 
structures” can affect both “subsequent ownership structures,” or “structure-driven path 
dependence,” and “subsequent structures through their effect on the legal rules governing 
corporations,” or “rule-driven path dependence” (emphasis omitted)); Eric Engle & Tetiana 
Danyliuk, Emulating the German Two-Tier Board and Worker Participation in U.S. Law: A 
Stakeholder Theory of the Firm, 45 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 69, 110 (2015) (noting the role of 
path dependence). 
 150. Cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1549, 1567 (1989) (discussing the externalities introduced by the use of non-standard corporate 
forms). But cf. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 
84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (developing the “‘triviality hypothesis’ that, appearances 
notwithstanding, state corporate law is trivial: it does not prevent companies—managers and 
investors together—from establishing any set of governance rules they want” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 151. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 723 (1997) (“Most 
broadly, the use of generally accepted accounting principles as a baseline convention for bond 
covenants and the choice of Delaware as a state of incorporation facilitate obtaining high quality 
accounting and legal advice, respectively.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do 
Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 
683 (2005) (“Delaware chancellors and supreme court justices devote a considerable amount of 
time to fashioning sensible, fair corporate law decisions in a timely way.”). 
 152. See Strine, supra note 151, at 680 (“[C]orporation law in Delaware is influenced by 
only the two constituencies whose views are most important in determining where entities 
incorporate: managers and stockholders.”). 
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Without some kind of industry-wide (or economy-wide) agreement, 
these information asymmetries and collective action problems mean that 
the boards of individual firms—which are, at that point, still governed 
solely by shareholders—will rationally fail to adopt the approach that 
would have the greatest utility overall.153 The industry-wide bargaining 
that took place in post-war Germany involved exactly the kind of 
cooperation needed to lift corporate players out of these situations. But it 
is unlikely that such conditions will naturally arise in the American 
economy any time soon. 
3.  The Battle for Corporate Power 
Because American corporate law scholarship has not really taken 
codetermination seriously, it has not joined the true conflict at the heart 
of the debate: the struggle between shareholders and employees—
between capital and labor—for power. The U.S. system is premised on 
the idea that total shareholder control will keep labor in check and spur 
management to get the highest returns possible for equity holders. By 
labeling employees with all other stakeholders as “fixed” claimants, 
shareholder primacy can categorize an increase in shareholder returns as 
an overall increase in efficiency rather than a claim to a large share of the 
pie. But as corporate profits and share prices have ratcheted upwards, and 
workers’ wages have remained stagnant, the effects of shareholder 
primacy can be keenly felt. Shareholders run the game, and they use their 
power to increase their gains. 
Codetermination breaks this shareholder vise-grip on corporate 
control. It empowers employees by giving them a voice and a role within 
the governance of the firm. As a result, shareholders are likely to see their 
power within the corporation diminish. But this is a feature, not a bug. 
There are larger empirical questions about which system works best that 
can be measured in different ways: equity prices, wages, Tobin’s Q, gross 
domestic product (GDP), environmental harm, or return to creditors. As 
discussed in Part III, codetermination has scored solidly under these 
measures, and it has held up even more strongly in the wake of recent 
crises. But the ideological questions of shareholder and worker power are 
a critical part of the debate—one that law-and-economics research has 
largely ignored. 
In their recent working paper, Dammann and Eidenmüller work 
within the traditional law-and-economics framework in arguing against 
the adoption of codetermination on U.S. soil.154 But rather than mounting 
a full-throated defense of shareholder primacy, they characterize 
 
 153. See Levine & Tyson, supra note 147, at 186. Under the prisoner’s dilemma framework, 
individual players make less-than-optimal choices because of the interdependency of outcomes 
and the inability to trust their partner/opponent.  
 154. Dammann & Eidenmüller, supra note 127, at 877. 
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codetermination as a fine proposition for Germans, but unavailing here in 
the United States.155 They do not, for example, outright argue that having 
worker representatives on the board will distract from shareholder wealth 
maximization; instead, the problem is having two conflicting sets of goals 
that will confuse matters.156 At times, their arguments seem self-
defeating. For example, they minimize codetermination’s usefulness to 
workers by pointing out the ways in which U.S. workers are 
comparatively powerless; as such, they would not be able to use board 
representation as effectively as German workers can.157 The relative 
powerlessness of workers, on this view, becomes reason to retain the core 
feature of the governance structure that disempowers them to begin with. 
Elsewhere, they downplay the non-pecuniary benefits of 
codetermination, such as providing dignity to workers and strengthening 
economic democracy, by maintaining that the main concern of employees 
“is not being treated in a dehumanizing fashion at their workplace in a 
(large) corporation. Rather, it is losing their job entirely or having to 
move into the precarious position of a (seemingly) independent 
contractor in the gig economy.”158 It doesn’t even seem to register that 
there might be a relationship between these two concerns.159  
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 909–10. Dammann and Eidenmüller admit that there is quite a bit of evidence that 
more diverse boards improve corporate decision-making, but then assert—without evidence—
that this is true only when boards members have the same goals. Id. at 910. Of course, board 
members are diverse precisely because they do not entirely agree with each other, even with 
respect to corporate goals, and shareholders themselves do not have homogeneous preferences 
with regard to corporate goals. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 94, at 449. And as discussed in 
Part III, German supervisory board members are required by law to put the interest of the 
corporation above those of their constituents, and there is quite a bit of evidence that supervisory 
board meetings are marked by a great degree of cooperation between shareholder and employee 
representatives. See infra Part III. The authors completely overlook this evidence, and instead 
emphasize the importance of board collegiality by trying to analogize the situation to the corporate 
boards that cumulative voting might produce, which, according to one 1955 article, detrimentally 
affected collegiality (despite the fact that majority and minority shareholders supposedly shared 
a common goal of maximizing shareholder wealth). See Dammann & Eidenmüller, supra note 
127, at 912 & n.145.  
 157. Id. at 902–04. 
 158. Id. at 907–08. 
 159. Dammann and Eidenmüller recognize that the strength of an economic democracy is 
not measured by the number of elective offices or the number of votes cast, but by whether citizens 
meaningfully participate in a way that provides “social constraints over the use of private capital.” 
Id. at 906 (quoting Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance 
Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 167). One of the 
principal criticisms of our system of democracy is that politicians are beholden to corporate 
interests, and corporations are not looking out for their employees. In a new article, Dammann 
and Eidenmüller make the case that “codetermination can serve as a mechanism to protect the 
democratic process by curbing excessive corporate power.” Jens Dammann & Horst Eidenmüller, 
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In terms of the downsides of codetermination, Dammann and 
Eidenmüller focus on the role of employees in confronting corporate risk. 
Based on the different incentives between shareholders and workers, they 
argue, companies run by diversified capitalists have been and should 
remain more willing to take risks than companies with significant labor 
involvement.160 Codetermination discourages risk-taking, and extreme 
risk-taking is an American specialty.161 This argument, of course, 
assumes that there is an optimal level of risk-taking, that the United States 
happens to be at that optimal point, and that shareholders are in the best 
position to assess the potential downsides of risky corporate behavior 
with respect to all corporate constituents. These are all dubious 
propositions. They present the fact that American firms are significantly 
more likely to undergo bankruptcy than their German counterparts as a 
positive development.162 Dammann and Eidenmüller also believe that the 
U.S. bankruptcy system will interact poorly with codetermination.163 
Unlike the German system—where an insolvency administrator does 
most of the work—the U.S. bankruptcy system generally relies on 
creditor governance with the debtor-in-possession running the show.164 
Greater levels of employee input might slow down this system, since the 
debtor’s decision-making process on the restructuring plan “would be 
fraught with difficult discussions between shareholder and employee 
representatives.”165 This concern, if truly problematic, could be resolved 
through changes to the bankruptcy law—a possibility Dammann and 
Eidenmüller overlook.  
We do not pretend to claim that there are not economic arguments in 
favor of the current U.S. system. But the academic debate about the 
superiority of shareholder primacy versus codetermination has not really 
 
Taming the Corporate Leviathan: Codetermination and the Democratic State 4 (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst. Working Paper, Paper No. 536/2020, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3680769 [https://perma.cc/5N5X-WKXE]. 
They argue that “[b]y ‘democratizing’ decision-making within large corporations, 
codetermination protects and strengthens the democratic political process outside corporations.” 
Id. at 5. The presence of employee representatives on boards can curb corporate power in the 
financial and regulatory arenas and can address the “undue concentration of financial resources 
in society.” Id. at 7. 
 160. Dammann & Eidenmüller, supra note 127, at 932–34. 
 161. Id. at 934–35. 
 162. Id. at 934, 937 (“Employee representatives who desire reelection hardly will want to 
jeopardize their prospects by agreeing to investments that workers oppose. Thus, it is reasonable 
to think that employee representatives generally will try to prevent corporate boards from ‘betting 
the farm.’ The empirical evidence is consistent with this narrative. . . .  [F]irms in the United 
States, on average, face a higher probability of bankruptcy than firms in stakeholder countries 
such as Germany.”). 
 163. See id. at 917–18. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 918. 
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been joined. The strategy of law-and-economics scholars to this point has 
been primarily to ignore, belittle, or sequester codetermination as a 
practice that does not deserve real examination. We believe differently 
and hope that this treatment will inspire American academics to take 
another, deeper look. 
III.  CODETERMINATION IN PRACTICE 
So, how well has codetermination worked in Germany? Much of the 
scholarship evaluating the system has centered on its role in promoting 
broader goals such as social cohesion and fairness.166 The bottom-line, 
economic effects of codetermination (which we will turn to shortly) are 
either seen as secondary or as necessarily following from the achievement 
of these societal goals.167 That is, codetermination is viewed less in terms 
of an economic system than as one designed to promote a well-
functioning democracy and help prevent social division—in particular, 
the division between labor and capital. And, on this broad level, it is 
thought to be quite successful. 
Codetermination’s success on the social level has carried over to the 
boardroom, where the relationship between labor and capital is relatively 
harmonious.168 Shareholder and employee representatives typically meet 
separately with the managing board before coming together at the 
supervisory board meetings.169 These pre-meetings allow representatives 
to focus on the interests of their constituents and raise concerns with the 
management boards.170 Recent studies have revealed that the supervisory 
meetings themselves are marked by a great deal of cooperation between 
shareholder and employee representatives.171 This cooperation may be 
fostered in part by the legal requirement that shareholder and employee 
representatives must, at that point, put the interest of the corporation over 
those of their respective constituents.172 While the relationships at the 
supervisory board level are not perfect, they are a far cry from the law-
and-economics predictions of firm-destroying voting cycles and other 
visions of inter-board squabbling and dysfunction.  
A.  Codetermination and Economic Performance 
There are a limited number of studies that evaluate the actual effects 
of codetermination on firm behavior and economic success. And most of 
those studies focus on a relatively narrow set of outcomes associated with 
 
 166. See ADDISON, supra note 62, at 2. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See Sandrock, supra note 68, at 131. 
 169. See du Plessis & Saenger, supra note 72, at 49. 
 170. See id. 
 171. Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 60, at 186. 
 172. See id. at 184; du Plessis & Saenger, General Meeting, supra note 66, at 66. 
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shareholder interests. Robert Scholz and Sigurt Vitols recently cataloged 
the thirty-seven extant studies on the relationship between 
codetermination and firm performance and found that fourteen of them 
focused on stock market performance and thirteen on profitability.173 
Seven studies analyzed codetermination’s impact on productivity, which 
would be of interest to both shareholders and employees (and, more 
broadly, society).174 Very few studies analyzed issues that would seem to 
be most important to employees, such as wages, employment levels, and 
job security.175 
This evaluative approach is odd and continues to infect most 
discussions of codetermination. One would expect that, all things being 
equal, a shift from full shareholder control to partial shareholder control 
would decrease the gains allocated to shareholders. Employees can, in 
various ways, allocate a greater proportion of the returns from joint 
production to themselves if they have governance power. These 
distributional shifts would leave shareholders with less of the pie, even if 
the firm had the same or greater gains overall.  
In any case, do not be misled into thinking that the effect of 
codetermination on shareholders alone reveals its effect on the firm, 
broadly construed to include all corporate constituents. This lack of 
identity between shareholder interests and firm interests seems obvious 
and raises the question of why so many studies appear to assume they are 
one and the same. Prominent academics have critiqued this focus on 
shareholder wealth maximization, even in the context of U.S. 
companies.176 A comprehensive assessment of codetermination must 
include its impact on all corporate constituents.  
What this means is that many studies, some of which are discussed 
later in this Article, necessarily render an incomplete picture of 
codetermination—one that largely focuses on the success of the firm as 
measured by stock price or profits. This puts one in a curious position 
 
 173. Scholz & Vitols, supra note 59, at 235 & tbl.1. The overall numbers add up to more 
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shareholder interests is still clear, with only five studies involving wages, and not a single study 
analyzing codetermination’s effect on any measures of corporate social responsibility. See id. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See id. at 235. 
 176. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 639–40 (2006) (“Indeed, most studies do not expressly consider the 
implications of using shareholder wealth as a measure of firm value, despite the fact that they 
purport to be conducting a general efficiency analysis in which the primary goal should be 
maximizing the size of the corporate surplus, while considerations of the appropriate division of 
the corporate surplus should be secondary.”); see also Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies 
Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 248 (2017) 
(discussing the difference between shareholder utility maximization and shareholder wealth 
maximization). 
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when trying to make a broader assessment. If these studies show that 
shareholders come out behind, scholars still need to ask whether their 
losses are counterbalanced, or even outweighed, by gains to other 
constituents. If, on the other hand, shareholders fortunes are unaffected 
by codetermination, or if shareholders even come out ahead, then one can 
be relatively confident that the German system of shared governance 
delivers to corporate constituents across the board.177  
A number of studies have assessed the economic effects of 
codetermination, with a consensus that has shifted back and forth over 
the last four decades.178 Some early studies from the 1980s found that 
codetermination had very little impact on corporate performance.179 
Those studies, however, were criticized on a number of methodological 
grounds.180 Several more sophisticated evaluations in the 1990s and early 
2000s gave a more pessimistic account, finding that codetermination was 
associated with, among other things, lower productivity and lower 
profits.181 That consensus, though, soon gave way to a third phase in the 
literature, one that both reversed the principal findings of the second-
 
 177. Making a similar point on the range of possibilities, John Addison explains, “Worker 
representation on company boards arouses strong feelings. At one extreme it is viewed as 
tantamount to wealth confiscation with palpably adverse consequences for firm performance. At 
another, it is viewed as helping guarantee cooperative labor relations, with long-term gains in 
terms of productivity and improved worker morale. Intermediate positions would recognize the 
joint occurrence of allocative and distributive effects, permitting either increases or decreases in 
overall welfare . . . .” ADDISON, supra note 62, at 119 (citation omitted). On this question of 
economic performance, the Authors take the intermediate position. 
 178. For the best summary of the literature through 2008 and a discussion of the three initial 
phases of research detailed below, see id. at 108–21. See also Uwe Jirjahn, Ökonomische 
Wirkungen der Mitbestimmung in Deutschland: Ein Update, 131 SCHMOLLERS JAHRBUCH 3, 32–
42 (2011) (reviewing studies relating to the effects of codetermination regarding productivity, 
returns and capital market valuation, innovation, and adherence to legal regulations).  
 179. See, e.g., Jan Svejnar, Relative Wage Effects of Unions, Dictatorship and 
Codetermination: Econometric Evidence from Germany, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 188, 195 (1981) 
(finding codetermination associated with higher earnings in the iron and steel industry but not in 
the coal mining industry); Guiseppe Benelli et al., Labor Participation in Corporate Policy-
Making Decisions: West Germany’s Experience with Codetermination, 60 J. BUS. 553, 573 (1987) 
(finding no real differences between firms with codetermination and without codetermination 
across a variety of measures of performance); Michael A. Gurdon & Anoop Rai, Codetermination 
and Enterprise Performance: Empirical Evidence from West Germany, 42 J. ECON. & BUS. 289, 
301 (1990) (finding codetermination led to higher profitability but lower productivity). 
 180. See ADDISON, supra note 62, at 109. Those early studies were criticized for reasons that 
included “sample size, data frequency (in the case of stock returns), lack of controls for other 
relevant economic or organizational variables, focus on a single event, and narrow reach.” Id. 
 181. See id. at 109–15; see also Felix R. FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Economic Effects of 
Codetermination, 95 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 365, 373–74 (1993) (finding that the shift to quasi-
parity codetermination in 1976 had negative effect on productivity); Gary Gorton & Frank A. 
Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of German Codetermination, 2 J. EUR. ECON. 
ASS’N 863, 895 (2004) (finding that moving from one-third to quasi-parity codetermination 
negatively affected shareholder wealth). 
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phase studies (finding them to be artifacts of a particular method of 
assessment)182 and found that codetermination was also modestly 
associated with greater innovation.183 These more optimistic assessments 
were bolstered by a couple of modern financial studies on the market 
value of the firm, which found that “prudent levels of employee 
representation” led to better board decision-making by improving 
monitoring and thus reducing agency costs.184 “Armed with better 
information,” Professors Larry Fauver and Michael Fuerst explain, “the 
supervisory board may more easily recognize and thwart investments and 
strategies that represent private control benefits to large shareholders or 
management through asset stripping, pyramiding, dilution of small 
investors, crony capitalism, and simple perquisites.”185 A similar finding 
was made by Kornelius Kraft and Marija Ugarković, who found that the 
1976 strengthening of codetermination positively affected returns on 
equity.186 Uwe Jirjahn, summing up the studies in 2011, reported that 
codetermination was connected to higher productivity, and that more 
recent studies (unlike earlier ones) had found that codetermination also 
had a positive effect on profitability and capital market valuation.187 This 
third, rather optimistic phase of assessment brings this Article to one of 
the most profound tests of all systems of corporate governance: the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2008. 
The financial crisis did not spare any of the world’s major economies, 
but some recovered more quickly than others. Germany, in particular, 
recovered more quickly and more thoroughly than many other countries, 
 
 182. See, e.g., Felix FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Co-determination, Efficiency and 
Productivity, 43 BRIT. J. INDUS. RELS. 233, 234 (2005) (explaining that previous studies could not 
account for firm-specific effects because they used cross-sectional data); ADDISON, supra note 62, 
at 115–16, 120. The negative findings in the second phase of studies may have been artefacts of 
the cross-section estimation they used, which (by definition) did not control for firm heterogeneity 
or firm-specific effects. Id. at 115, 120. 
 183. See, e.g., Kornelius Kraft et al., Codetermination and Innovation, 35 CAMBRIDGE J. 
ECON. 145, 167 (2011) (concluding that it can be estimated that codetermination has a positive 
effect on innovation); see also ADDISON, supra note 62, at 116 (noting two studies which found 
modestly higher research and development activity among codetermined firms).  
 184. See Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance Include 
Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 673, 673–
74 (2006); see also Renaud, supra note 142, at 691 (noting that the “participation theory” of 
codetermination suggests that allowing employees to have a voice against exit options will lead 
firms to higher productivity).  
 185. See Fauver & Fuerst, supra note 184, at 703. 
 186. See Kornelius Kraft & Marija Ugarković, Gesetzliche Mitbestimmung und 
Kapitalrendite [Co-Determination and Return on Equity], 226 JAHRBÜCHER FUR 
NATIONALÖKONOMIE UND STATISTIK 588, 600–01 (2006). 
 187. See Jirjahn, supra note 178, at 52. 
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and did so, at least in part, because of its corporate governance model.188 
Economic downturns are always difficult for companies and their 
employees. But codetermination allows the management of many 
companies “to more easily seek the consent of its workforce for carrying 
out more or less drastic measures.”189 These measures include a system 
(Kurzarbeit) that temporarily reduces the working hours (and salaries) of 
many of the employees.190 This avoids painful layoffs and allows 
companies to retain their core workforces, which, in turn, allowed the 
economy as a whole to avoid the worst of the economic slump.191 This 
led one group of scholars to conclude: “Particular to Germany was the 
social partner’s willingness to work together during this specific 
economic hardship. . . . [I]t cannot be denied that the quality of industrial 
relations was a factor in overcoming the crisis.”192 
There are, of course, some caveats to this story. The labor stockpiling 
that smoothed over the effects of the recession was tailor-made for the 
particular economic woes that hit Germany: a short-term demand shock 
that primarily affected the manufacturing sector.193 More typically, 
German employment follows GDP, sometimes with a slight delay.194 But 
the system worked surprisingly well this time around, and the resulting 
difference between Germany and the United States was apparent in the 
early part of the recovery period.195  
A number of new studies came out during the period of recovery that 
were consistent with the third phase of the literature, showing that 
codetermination generally had positive economic effects. One of the 
stronger results came from a 2020 study by Simon Jäger, Benjamin 
Schoefer, and Jörg Heining, which found, “if anything, that board-level 
codetermination raises capital formation.”196 This shift toward more 
 
 188. See Jean J. du Plessis et al., Preface to GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 60, at vii; Sandrock, supra note 68, at 136. 
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 194. Id. 
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capital-intensive production may be the result of worker involvement in 
investment decisions, the fact that worker representatives may have 
longer-term views than shareholders or executives, or because shared 
governance generally facilitates cooperation between firms and their 
employees.197 Shareholders, on this account, may be better off investing 
in firms where employees have a stronger governance role. Other studies 
were more circumspect. One model by Kraft found that codetermination 
did not significantly affect productivity in either direction.198 And an 
event study by Stefan Petry provided a note of caution, showing that the 
expansion of codetermination in 1976 was correlated with a decrease in 
share price at the time.199 
Codetermination may also strengthen bonds between management 
and labor, perhaps to the detriment of shareholders. A recent study by 
Professors Chen Lin, Thomas Schmid, and Yang Sun found that 
executive compensation and employee job protections increased when 
companies came under the aegis of codetermination.200 Not surprisingly, 
integrating employee representatives into leadership can lead those 
representatives to be closer with their boardroom cohort. That can lead 
employee representatives to be more understanding of management 
concerns, or managers to be more solicitous of the worker 
perspective.201Overall, however, it is fair to say that the emerging 
consensus of the studies of the effects of codetermination on firm 
performance is quite positive. A number of studies have shown that 
employee representation is accompanied by higher productivity, 
profitability, and capital investment. And it is clear that codetermination 
contributed to Germany’s ability to recover from the Global Financial 
Crisis much more quickly than other countries without strong systems of 
employee representation. Shareholders have fared pretty well. But how 
does codetermination affect the fortunes of other corporate constituents?  
B.  The Effect of Codetermination on Other Stakeholders 
A number of recent studies have demonstrated the effects of 
codetermination on a range of corporate constituents. The most obvious 
constituents to examine are employees. One would expect that employees 
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would lead the pack of constituents expected to gain from more direct 
board representation. And, in fact, employees do appear to be better off 
under codetermination, at least by their own measures. But, as foretold 
by the story of German employment during the Global Financial Crisis, 
those employees may measure success in ways that aren’t limited to the 
size of their paychecks. 
As described above, Germany’s bounce back from the financial crisis 
was largely a result of the ability of their firms to keep employment levels 
relatively stable. Those employment levels, however, did not come 
without cost: they were maintained at the price of the number of hours 
worked, bonuses (or the lack of them), and resulting lower wages and 
salaries.202 But this is exactly the kind of deal that employees bargained 
for under the Kurzarbeit system.203 
A recent study by E. Han Kim, Ernst Maug, and Christoph Scheider 
confirmed that employees at full-parity codetermined firms are better 
protected against layoffs during industry downturns.204 This job security, 
however, comes at the price of significantly lower wages.205 Employees 
at codetermined firms pay a premium equal to 3.3% of their wages for 
this employment insurance.206 Importantly, this swap of wages for job 
security has no effect on shareholders one way or the other.207 This is 
similar to the finding by Jäger, Schofer, and Heining, who concluded that 
“worker representation on boards does not appear to affect wage setting, 
as measured by average wages, firms’ wage policies, the wage structure 
within firms, or the degree of rent sharing.”208 This suggests, then, that 
this feature of employment insurance at codetermined firms was not a 
result of employee entrenchment in the form of employee–manager 
collusion, and it did not come at the expense of other corporate 
constituents.209 Kraft, however, found that while codetermination did not 
affect productivity, it did lead to a significant increase in employee 
bargaining power and affected the distribution of rents.210 
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That is not to say, however, that codetermination does not affect other 
corporate constituents. Employee representation, for example, turns out 
to be good for creditors. Employees have interests that align with those 
of creditors along a couple of dimensions. As Chen Lin, Thomas Schmid, 
and Yuhai Xuan explained in a 2018 study, “Employee representatives 
who aim to protect the interests of the firm’s employees can 
(unintentionally) also help to protect the interests of banks as both 
stakeholders are interested in the long-term survival and stability of the 
firm.”211 For that reason, employee representation and bank ownership 
can act as “substitutes” for one another.212  
The result of this interest alignment redounds to the benefit of both 
the firm and the banks. The study found that codetermination was 
associated with favorable financing conditions, lower costs of debt, 
longer debt maturities, and fewer covenants.213 Codetermined firms were 
also found to have entered into fewer (and better) merger and acquisition 
deals, have more stable cash flows, and have less exposure to 
idiosyncratic risk.214 The authors of the study concluded that “a direct 
voice of employees in firms’ governance structure can be a powerful 
mechanism to reduce agency conflicts between debt providers and firms 
and to improve their financing opportunities and conditions.”215  
Creditors are not the only other constituents that might benefit from 
employee representation. Scholz and Vitols recently evaluated the impact 
of codetermination on a firm’s commitment to substantive corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) measures.216 The study was novel in several 
respects. Unlike earlier work, which assumed that worker influence was 
the same at all codetermined firms, the authors developed measures of 
the strength of codetermination based on a number of factors, including 
obvious ones, such as the level of codetermination (one-third, quasi, or 
full), and less obvious ones, such as the extent of worker representation 
on board committees and the importance of the supervisory board in firm 
governance.217 The study was also the first to look at codetermination’s 
effect on CSR outcomes.218 
Scholz and Vitols found that the strength of codetermination was 
positively related to substantive CSR policies, including setting concrete 
goals on emission reductions, the publication of a separate CSR report 
(or section in its annual report), and the presence of a job security (no-
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layoff) policy.219 These were deemed “substantive” CSR measures 
because they required an expenditure or investment in company 
resources.220 There was not a corresponding relationship to merely 
symbolic measures, indicating that employee representatives have little 
interest in measures that do not result in direct improvements for 
workers.221  
The recent performance of the German economy has begun to change 
the way people view codetermination. By 2016, its popularity among the 
German people rose to an all-time high.222 The German business 
community looks at it in a more positive light,223 and foreign 
businesspeople—long baffled by the complex codetermination laws—
have come to see some of its advantages.224 In sum, this new economic 
research suggests that employee representation on corporate boards 
benefits employees, creditors, and the broader community through the 
pursuit of meaningful CSR measures. Employees are often able to secure 
greater job security (though at some expense to their wages) in a way that 
avoids hold-up issues. Their representation also seems to help other 
corporate constituents through a variety of mechanisms, including the 
promotion of greater information flow within the firm and the fact that 
other constituents often have interests that align with those of employees 
(such as a concern for the long-term health and stability of the firm). In 
any case, the results of these recent studies are quite clear: 
codetermination benefits a wide range of corporate constituents at little 
or no cost to shareholders. 
CONCLUSION 
As the dogma of shareholder primacy is reevaluated, the structure and 
experience of the codetermination model deserves examination. The 
success of the German system serves as an empirical rejoinder to the 
hypothetical arguments used by law-and-economics scholars to justify 
the exclusive shareholder franchise. Codetermination was born of 
negotiation at a time when labor and capital had roughly equal bargaining 
power. As a result, Germany developed a system that is dramatically 
more employee-oriented than Anglo-American corporate law. The 
standard thinking in U.S. corporate circles would predict—and has 
predicted—the failure of this deviant system. But German firms have not 
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been paralyzed by more heterogeneous board electorates. And they have 
not been destroyed by voting cycles. Rather, they have, in many 
important ways, outperformed their U.S. counterparts. The arguments 
against employee representation were already in trouble on their own 
theoretical terms. The presence of a significant, well-functioning 
counterexample to shareholder primacy should be further cause to 
question. 
Does this mean that German-style codetermination is without faults? 
Of course not.225 The system has been criticized for its large, two-tiered 
board structures.226 It makes use of an (arguably) unnecessarily baroque 
version of an electoral college to elect employee representatives.227 
Moreover, the recent success of the German system does not mean that it 
would directly translate to corporations in the United States. Perhaps 
supervisory codetermination can only flourish in conjunction with the 
strong union presence and works councils found in Germany. (Or perhaps 
it’s the other way around.)  
Nevertheless, German codetermination is working well enough that it 
helps confirm many of the arguments made in favor of a shared approach 
to corporate governance. Hopefully, this Article’s review of 
codetermination spurs American scholars to consider the German model 
and reimagine the possibilities for a more efficient and more just 
framework for corporate law. 
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